The seaborne steam coal market changed in recent years. Trade volumes grew dynamically, important players emerged and since 2007 prices increased significantly and remained relatively high since then. In this paper we analyse market equilibria in the years 2006 and 2008 by testing for two possible market structure scenarios in this market: perfect competition and an oligopoly setup with major exporters competing in quantities. We conclude from our results that international steam coal trade is not perfectly competitive as there is a large spread between marginal costs and prices and a low capacity utilisation in 2008. Further, trade flows are generally more diversified in reality than in the competitive scenario. However, also the Cournot scenarios fail to accurately explain real market outcomes. We conclude that only more sophisticated models of strategic behaviour can predict market equilibria in international steam coal trade.
Introduction
Behind oil but before natural gas, coal is the second most important primary energy source. It is mainly used for electricity and heat generation. About 36% of the global electricity generation is based on hard coal.
1 Although most of the coal is produced and consumed domestically, international steam coal trade is on the rise. The supply side is dominated by countries with a mainly export oriented mining industry like South Africa, Australia, Indonesia and Colombia. The latter two are relatively new players on this market which expanded their supply capacity quickly during the last decade. Moreover, in some countries the government has put its focus on developing national coal strategies in the last years, often tightening their control of coal exports, for instance in China or Indonesia.
5
Due to governmental control in some countries or the influence of large company consortia and industry associations in other countries, steam coal supply tends to be aggregated on a national level rather than on a firm level.
Given the growing importance of several new suppliers, the emergence of national energy and coal strategies in several countries and the dramatic recent steam coal price evolutions we test if market structures in 2006 and 2008 can be described either by a competitive setup or an 1 See IEA (2010b). Data for 2008. 2 The classification of hard coal (distinct from lignite) comprises steam coal and coking coal. Steam coal (or thermal coal) is mainly used in electricity generation whereas coking coal is used for metallurgical purposes. 3 See . 4 The Asian marker (North Western European marker) was 79 USD/t (70 USD/t) in 2009 and 105 USD/t (92 USD/t) in 2010. 5 China constantly reduced export licenses (from 80 mt in 2005 to less than 20 mt in 2011). Further, the Chinese government started a programme to restructure and consolidate the coal mining industry (Peng 2010) . In Indonesia only Indonesian companies or consortia are eligible for mining concessions (Baruya 2009). oligopolistic setup. To do so, we develop an optimisation model for computing spatial market equilibria in competitive and oligopolistic international trade markets. The equilibrium modelling approach was introduced by Samuelson (1952) with his work on the programming of competitive equilibria in spatial markets, and generalised for various non-competitive market structure scenarios e.g. by Judge (1964, 1971) , Harker (1984 Harker ( , 1986 and Yang et al. (2002) . The model is implemented as a mixed complementarity programme (MCP) with the software GAMS and based on a unique coal market dataset of EWI. This dataset comprises inter alia supply capacities and costs including time dependent supply cost functions based on input price evolutions to account for recent supply cost increases.
We find that actual prices in 2006 are in line with the competitive benchmark in Europe but prices in Asian importing regions exceed marginal costs. In 2008, prices and volumes are not consistent with the competitive benchmark. Furthermore, trade flows are more diversified in the real market than in the competitive scenario. However, also for both years, actual prices were lower than the oligopolistic prediction. Generally, the results indicate that competitive models are not able to fully reproduce coal market equilibria, particularly in 2008. This suggests that the degree of competition may recently have decreased in the coal trade market.
Literature on market conduct in international steam coal trade is relatively scarce. Abbey and Kolstad (1983) present a qualitative analysis of the potentials to exert market power in steam coal trade. Kolstad and Abbey (1984) were the first to quantitatively analyse strategic behaviour in international steam coal trade in the early 1980s using an MCP model. Besides perfect competition they model various imperfect market structures. The authors find that a non-competitive market structure consisting of a duopoly and a monopsony simulates the actual trade patterns well. However, since then the steam coal trade market has changed substantially. We follow the approach of Kolstad and Abbey (1984) by using an MCP model and update their research with recent data. The paper most closely related to ours is Haftendorn and Holz (2010 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: First, we will briefly outline the current situation on the seaborne steam coal trade market. Section three proceeds with a detailed description of the model and its properties. Then, in section four the supply and demand side data input is described. The scenario design is outlined in section five. Section six presents the model results and finally, section seven concludes the paper.
The seaborne steam coal trade market
The majority of steam coals are not traded internationally but are produced and consumed in domestic markets. In 2008 total global hard coal production was 5850 mt. 6 The two largest domestic markets are China and the USA together comprising more than 65% of total production. About 13% of the global steam coal production is traded internationally and more than 90% of international steam coal trade is seaborne. In this submarket two different types of suppliers interact with each other: Countries that have a dedicated export-oriented mining industry and countries with chiefly inland-oriented mining industries. 7 The former type primarily comprises South Africa, Colombia, Australia and Indonesia and holds most of the supply capacity for the international trade market. These export industries usually have a cost advantage over domestic industries due to good coal qualities, low mining costs and economical access to transport infrastructure. The latter type primarily consists of China, USA and Russia. These countries have some dedicated export collieries but most of the potential export capacity can serve both the national and the international market. Depending on the relation of export prices to domestic prices these mines supply either domestic consumers or maritime trade markets (swing suppliers). The majority of domestic mines are always extramarginal on international markets due to low coal quality, contractual obligations, high supply costs or the lack of access to infrastructure.
The seaborne trade market can be divided into a Pacific and an Atlantic market region. Kopal (2007) or Rademacher (2008) . 8 During the last decade trade flows between the two regions grew considerably and recent research has pointed out that the global steam coal market is well integrated (see e.g. Warrell (2006) or Li (2008) ). Nevertheless we use these terms in this paper in a geographical sense to better structure our analysis.
The Pacific market has grown more dynamically in recent years. High quantities are imported by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan -all three of them having virtually no indigenous coal production and therefore heavily rely on imports. However, most of the growth has come from emerging import regions like India, South East Asia and China. The supply side is dominated by Australia and Indonesia although the sustained high prices in Asia have attracted increasing spot volumes from South Africa and very recently also from Colombia.
Model Description
We develop a spatial equilibrium model for the seaborne steam coal market in which exporters and importers trade with each other. Coal exporters control one or more coal production regions (including the infrastructure) and coal importers are assigned to demand regions. These players trade steam coal with each other via bulk carrier shipping routes. It is assumed that the exporters' objective is to maximise their respective profits. Importers are assumed to act as price takers. The optimisation model is formulated as a mixed complementary problem (MCP) by deriving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. In equilibrium, the set of prices and quantities simultaneously satisfies all maximisation conditions. 
Where j p denotes the price in region j subject to the imported quantity. The parameter j a denotes the reservation price and the parameter j b specifies the slope of the demand function.
Production costs i W in node E i ∈ correspond to the integral under the quadratic FOB (freeon-board) supply function: The amount of coal supplied by player Z z ∈ to region I j ∈ is defined as j z x , , let us define j z x , as the quantity supplied by all other producers to region I j ∈ :
Producer z's profit maximisation problem z Ω consists of the objective function F z and the constraints (5) - (7):
Subject to:
Restriction (5) states that production in E i ∈ has to be at least as high as total exports. The second restriction (6) ensures that production in E i ∈ does not exceed the available capacity i C . The strictly quasi-concave objective function (4) and the convex restrictions (5)- (7) form an optimisation problem, which has a unique solution. The first order optimality conditions are thus necessary and sufficient for deriving a unique optimum if the set of feasible solutions is non-empty. The equilibrium conditions are derived using the first order derivatives of the Lagrangian of z Ω (KKT conditions). The Lagrangian multipliers z µ and i γ are shadow prices for player Z z ∈ and in region E i ∈ respectively. The variable z µ represents the value of a marginal unit of exports whereas i γ corresponds to the value of a marginal unit of production capacity. The KKT conditions can be expressed as follows:
The derivative
in (8) expresses player z's ability to influence the market price in I j ∈ by strategically choosing the amount of coal supplied, subject to his conjecture of the other producers' reaction. In the case of a Cournot-Nash oligopoly, 0 , ,
holds and KKT-condition (8) simplifies to (8a) under the assumption of a linear demand function. In a competitve market, however, a change of player z's supply will be fully offset by the other producers and therefore 1 , ,
holds. In the case of perfect competition and for fringe suppliers condition (8) simplifies to (8b).
Equation (1), the first order conditions (8) and (9) as well as capacity constraints (10) and (11) for all players Z z ∈ together constitute the optimisation problem. The unique solution for this set of inequalities yields the equilibrium for this market. This mixed complementary problem was implemented using the software GAMS. 
Dataset
The database used in this analysis stems from several extensive research projects conducted at Baruya (2007 ), Minchener (2004 and Crocker/Kowalchuk (2008) . 15 See e.g. Kopal (2007) , Rademacher (2008) , Bayer et al. (2009) and Ritschel/Schiffer (2005 
Mining costs and export capacity
Costs for mining consist of overburden removal and extraction costs, processing and washing costs as well as transportation costs within the colliery. The data on mining costs is based on expert interviews and the evaluation of annual reports and literature sources as described above. Since this data stems from heterogeneous sources and is mostly based on cost ranges and mining costs of representative mines we regard our data only as a proxy for real mining costs. The lack of data on some mines might cause distortions if we would model every single mine explicitly. Therefore we fit the available data of mine mouth cash costs and mining capacity to a quadratic marginal cost function by ordinary least squares. This method yields a supply curve that comprises the main characteristics and cost levels of each mining region. see table 2 ). Labour costs are one of the factors that typically differ between the coal producing countries. While salaries are low in countries like South Africa or Indonesia they are considerably higher in the USA or Australia. Meister (2008) , own database, see also Paulus and Trüby (2010) The mining cost curves are escalated according to the cost structures using price index data for the above mentioned commodities from various statistical offices. Table 3 presents an overview of the cost increases for the model mining regions.
Clearly, mining cost escalation affected producers differently. Major exporters with a large share of open cast production like Indonesia or Colombia generally experienced higher cost increases. Producers with a high proportion of underground mines like the U.S., South Africa or Australia were less affected. This is due to the different cost structures of underground mining operations. Underground mining technologies rely to a larger proportion on labour costs and electricity prices and other locally sourced materials. Except for steel products which are also an important input in deep mining, the increasing prices of fuel and oil derivatives, explosives and tyres did not raise underground mining costs. 
Transport costs, port handling fees and seaborne freight rates
Inland transport costs depend on the transportation mode and the distance from the coal fields to the export terminal. Coal is mainly hauled by rail or truck and in some cases by river barge.
Inland transport costs vary between the mining regions. While they are below 4 USD/t for the bulk of the Colombian production they may be as high as 25 USD/t for the transport from the Russian Kuzbass basin to the Baltic ports. We estimated the relative impact of diesel fuel and electricity cost escalation by the relative importance of truck and railway haulage for main transport routes. Port handling fees comprise costs for unloading, storage and loading onto vessels. Country specific average inland transport cost and port handling fees are added to the mining cost curve to derive FOB supply functions. Seaborne bulk carrier freight rates are a 
Demand data
As described in Section 3 we assume linear steam coal demand functions for all importing regions based on reference quantities and prices as well as elasticities (see table 4 Ritschel (2007 Several econometric analyses on short run steam coal demand elasticities and interfuel substitution have so far been published (see table 5 for an overview of the most important articles). Empirically estimated elasticities fall in range from -0.05 to -0.57. Although, the analyses differ in terms regional coverage, timeframe and methodological approach all authors find that price elasticity of steam coal is inelastic (|Elasticity| < 1). 17 Reference quantities are based on Ritschel (2007 Ritschel ( , 2010 and IEA (2007 IEA ( , 2010 Short run steam coal demand elasticity depends on various factors such as the power plant mix, the price of alternative fuels (particularly natural gas and in some regions fuel oil), the price of emission certificates, and total electricity demand to name but a few. Since these factors vary over time it is likely that some of the figures presented in table 5 are outdated today.
We therefore conduct a steam coal demand analysis for Europe using the dispatch module of 
DIME (Dispatch and Investment Model for Electricity markets in Europe

Simulation design
The focus of our analysis is on seaborne steam coal trade for which a spot market with several well established price indices exists. 22 Hence, we model only dedicated export mining capacity.
23
The supply structure in the steam coal trade market is heterogeneous. Hence, currently the majority of steam coal production and infrastructure is controlled by large Indonesian conglomerates or the government. International coal trade is an important national revenue earner, which may favour non-competitive behaviour on a government level.
Australia, Colombia and South Africa have privately owned mining industries 25 but the crucial export terminals are controlled by consortia consisting of the major players in the 21 For instance regionally differing gas prices or the installed capacity, availability and efficiency of the fleet. In some regions the competing generating technology may not be gas fired plants. Decreasing or increasing electricity demand also has an impact on coal demand elasticity. Moreover, emissions trading systems are not implemented in all regions (the U.S. for example have no GHG emissions trading system but an NO x trading system). 22 See Ekawan and Duchêne (2006) . 23 Export capacity data is based on Kopal (2007) and Rademacher (2008) 
Results
Simulation results for the year 2006
30
This supports the hypothesis that the international steam coal trade market was, to a certain degree, subject to competitive market mechanisms in 2006. However, the actual trade pattern is more diversified than the competitive one, particularly in the Pacific basin.
31 30 In reality South Africa, Russia, the U.S. and Colombia are the main suppliers to Europe. Small high cost producers like Poland or Norway are located close to the European market and generally ship their product to Europe. The North American demand region procures most of its imported coals from Latin American suppliers. 31 Several reasons may explain the deviations between the actual trade pattern and the competitive pattern. First, economies with a high import dependency like Taiwan, Japan or Korea may apply import diversification strategies for reasons of security of supply. This may also explain the slightly higher prices in the real market, since these economies would usually pay a premium for their import diversification. Second, calorific values are indeed the most important quality parameter and are accounted for in the analysis. However, the chemical composition of coals in regard to ash and sulphur content, moisture and volatile matter may be important efficiency determinants for power plants. Some power plants may be adjusted to a specific coal type or certain types of coal from different regions are often blended to optimise coal quality at the import terminal. Third, longterm bilateral contracts are still quite common in international coal trade. Finally, statistical errors and differences in energy-mass conversion may cause differences in statistics of traded volumes. Europe  56  59  2  1  17  28  3  6  3  8  2  North America  0  2  5  0  3  26  0  0  6  Latin America  2  0  1  0  2  3  0  0  1  China  0  1  0  22  14  0  1  0  8  Taiwan  0  2  0  0  29  0  16  0  13  Japan  0  9  0  3  23  0  16  0  60  Korea  0  3  0  1  20  0  17  0  20  India  3  0  0  0  17  0  5 structure is more diversified by nature due to its high production, the cost-minimal solution would imply that Taiwan procures all of its imports from Indonesia. Although Taiwan is a major importer of Indonesian coal it sources its imports from several exporters. In the noncompetitive market structure setup even high-cost fringe producers like the U.S. or Russia increase their market share. Since oligopolistic players withhold exports, prices rise and the fringe can capture rents by expanding its supply.
The results for 2006 reveal a relatively high degree of competition particularly in the Atlantic market. In the Pacific market we note that prices exceed marginal costs of delivery and that the actual trade pattern is more diversified than the competitive one. Clearly, the market outcome is not fully efficient from a welfare perspective suggesting that some noncompetitive mechanisms applied. Further, we reject our non-competitive oligopoly with competitive fringe scenario. In this setup too much quantity is withheld and consequently prices are too high compared to actual data. However, in reality diversified export structures of major Pacific suppliers are observable. Since diversification also occurs in the Cournot scenario this may be interpreted as an indication for strategic behaviour.
Haftendorn and Holz (2010) import prices in Europe were 147 USD/t, while simulated marginal cost prices (including seaborne freight rates) are 100 USD/t. Consequently, the remaining spread of 47 USD/t between marginal costs and actual prices is too large to justify perfectly competitive conduct on the seaborne trade market in this year. However, we can also reject the hypothesis of the Cournot-Nash oligopoly with competitive fringe in this market from a price perspective.
Oligopolistic mark-ups are too high and prices in the Cournot setup again exceed actual prices substantially. Thus, in the real market South African exporters could accrue higher rents in the Pacific basin indicating that prices were inefficiently high in Asian import regions.
Further, U.S. exports to Europe deviate significantly with the U.S. supplying about 15 mt more than in reality. The reason for this result may be the neglect of the U.S. domestic coal market in the model. Some of the export mining capacity attributed to the U.S. in the model normally serves the domestic market but generally has access to export infrastructure and the necessary coal quality to trade its product on the maritime market. However, exports depend not only on prices in the international market but also on domestic prices and contractual obligations. These issues can only be addressed by explicitly modelling the domestic markets. Moreover, in 2008 the efficient equilibrium quantity of 677 mt was not supplied. Instead, total trade volume stood at 606 mt implying that not all available supply capacity was in operation.
There are in fact a number of possibilities why export capacity may have been scarce during
2008
. 32 Although such short-run bottlenecks are hard to quantify it seems unlikely that they 32 The national market in the USA may have had an impact on exports due to contractual obligations or high demand. U.S. exports remained under their nominal capacity potential. Secondly, some export collieries may not 
Conclusions
In this paper we analysed the allocation and pricing of steam coal in the seaborne trade market. We demonstrated that competitive models are not able to fully reproduce real market show that the spread between marginal costs and prices increased in the analysed period and capacity utilisation decreased. Supply capacity analyses by Kopal (2007) , Rademacher (2008) and Bayer et al. (2009) Yet, the results of our oligopoly setup with major suppliers competing in quantities and facing a price-taking fringe do not present evidence for such a market structure to prevail in reality.
have reached full production capacity due to strikes and bad weather conditions (see Xstrata Annual Report, 2008) . Thirdly, interactions between the thermal coal market and the coking coal market may have had an impact. As a small proportion of a specific steam coal quality may also be upgraded to low quality metallurgical coal by washing. The boom on global steel markets in 2008 may have forced some steel mills to use coals which would otherwise have served as thermal coal. 33 Short term supply bottlenecks may have been responsible for the low utilisation of (nominal) capacity to some degree and may have contributed to the high prices. However, to our best knowledge there is so far no quantitative evidence to what extend such bottlenecks occurred in 2008 and it is unlikely that short term constraints have persisted over several years.
Anyhow, the export patterns of oligopolistic players in this scenario demonstrate that Cournot behaviour may generally be an explanation for the diversified steam coal allocation in reality.
In the context of the structural changes, the importance of coal in energy supply and the inability of competitive models to reproduce recent market equilibria, further research on steam coal market economics may be interesting. We suggest that future research focuses on other non-competitive pricing strategies such as spatial price discrimination and limit pricing or the role of domestic markets in international trade.
